Abstract. We propose the HBS (Hash Block Stealing) mode of operation. This is the first single-key mode that provably achieves the goal of providing deterministic authenticated encryption. The authentication part of HBS utilizes a newly-developed, vector-input polynomial hash function. The encryption part uses a blockcipher-based, counter-like mode. These two parts are combined in such a way as the numbers of finite-field multiplications and blockcipher calls are minimized. Specifically, for a header of h blocks and a message of m blocks, the HBS algorithm requires just h + m + 2 multiplications in the finite field and m + 2 calls to the blockcipher. Although the HBS algorithm is fairly simple, its security proof is rather complicated.
Introduction
The goals for blockcipher modes of operation are twofold. One is to establish authenticity, or data integrity. The other is to preserve privacy, or data confidentiality. These two goals are realized by the mechanism of authenticated encryption, or AE for short. An AE mode establishes authenticity and preserves privacy concurrently by producing a ciphertext into which both the tag and the encrypted message are embedded.
A crucial aspect of an AE mode is that its security is based on the use of either a randomized salt or a state-dependent value, which has been formalized as nonce-based AE [13] [14] [15] . In fact, many of the modern AE modes, including CCM [19] , GCM [9] and OCB [13] , are all nonce-based.
The nonce, however, needs to be handled with great care, because the misuse of nonce (i.e., repeating the same value) would generally lead to the complete collapse of systems based on these AE modes. This is due to the fact that the security designs have no concern in what happens when the nonce assumption becomes no longer true.
The problem of nonce misuse has been settled by the introduction of deterministic authenticated encryption [16] , or DAE for short. A DAE mode provides a deterministic, stateless algorithm that produces a ciphertext from the pair of a header and a message. A DAE mode can be used also as a conventional nonce-based AE mode by embedding a nonce value into the header. The virtue of a DAE mode is that it still ensures a certain level of security (i.e., all that an adversary can do is to detect a repetition of the same header-message pair) even when the DAE mode is not combined with a nonce element. Hence DAE is more robust than nonce-based AE.
The work [16] also proposes a concrete DAE mode of operation called SIV. The SIV mode is a blockcipher-based scheme, utilizing a vector-input version of the CMAC algorithm [5, 11] for its authentication part and the CTR (counter) mode for its encryption part. The SIV mode requires two independent keys for the underlying blockcipher, one being for the CMAC algorithm and another for the CTR mode.
The purpose of the current paper is to improve usability and performance over SIV. For this, we present a new DAE mode of operation called HBS (which stands for Hash Block Stealing), which has the following features.
1. The HBS mode requires just one key. It uses the same key for authentication and for encryption. 2. For authentication, the HBS mode adopts a vector-input polynomial-based universal hash function (rather than the blockcipher-based CMAC). 3. For encryption, the HBS mode uses a CTR-like scheme using a blockcipher, which operates differently from an ordinary CTR mode. 4. The numbers of finite-field multiplications (in hashing) and blockcipher calls are minimized. 5. We provide the HBS mode with concrete proofs of security.
In general, reducing keying material without compromising security reduces the cost of sharing, saving, and updating the secret key. Also, changing from a blockcipher-based MAC to polynomial-based universal hashing increases efficiency on many platforms [3, 17] , as in changing from CCM [19] , which uses a CBC-MAC, to GCM [9] , which employs polynomial-based hashing.
It turns out that meeting the above objectives is demanding. We introduce the notion of a vector-input ϵ-almost XOR universal hash function and develop a new polynomial-based hashing that meets our requirements. We also devise a somewhat odd way of incrementation in a CTR mode, which is necessary for the security of the scheme and is non-trivially binded with the new polynomial hash function. As a result, the security proofs become rather involved.
Preliminaries
Notation. If x is a finite string, then |x| denotes its length in bits. If x and y are two equal-length strings, then x ⊕ y denotes the XOR of x and y. If x and y are finite strings, then x∥y denotes their concatenation. Given finite strings * is the set of all finite strings (including the empty string), and for a positive integer ℓ, ({0, 1} * ) ℓ is the set of all vectors (x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x ℓ−1 ), where
For positive integers n and j such that n ≤ 2 j − 1, ⟨j⟩ n is the big-endian n-bit binary representation of j. For a finite string x and a positive integer n such that |x| ≥ n, msb(n, x) is the most significant n bits of x. For a positive integer n, 0 n is the n-times repetition of 0's. We write N for the set of non-negative integers. Given a real number x, the symbol ⌈x⌉ denotes the smallest integer greater than or equal to x. If X is a finite set, then #X is the cardinality of X, and we let x R ← X denote the process of selecting an element from X uniformly at random and assigning it to x. The Finite Field of 2 n Elements. We regard the set {0, 1} n as the finite field of 2 n elements (relative to some irreducible polynomial). For x, y ∈ {0, 1} n , the symbol x · y denotes the product of x and y. We write
, and so on. The ⊕ operation corresponds with the addition in the field.
Blockciphers and SPRP Adversaries. A blockcipher is a function
n (i.e., a permutation family). The positive integer n is the block length, and an n-bit string is called a block.
k , then k is the key length. The SPRP notion for blockciphers was introduced in [6] and later made concrete in [1] . Let Perm(n) denote the set of all permutations on {0, 1}
n . This set can be regarded as a blockcipher by assigning a unique string (a key) to each permutation. We say that P is a random permutation if P R ← Perm(n). An adversary is a probabilistic algorithm (a program) with access to one or more oracles. An SPRP-adversary A has access to two oracles and returns a bit. The two oracles are either the encryption oracle E K (·) and the decryption oracle E −1 K (·), or a random permutation oracle P (·) and its inverse oracle P −1 (·). We define the advantage Adv sprp E (A) as
For an adversary A, A's running time is denoted by time(A). The running time is its actual running time (relative to some fixed RAM model of computation) and its description size (relative to some standard encoding of algorithms). The details of the big-O notation in a running-time reference depend on the RAM model and the choice of encoding.
Specification of HBS

A Vector-Input Universal Hash Function F
In this section, we define a new vector-input universal hash function F . Let n be a fixed block length, e.g., n = 128. Before defining F , we first define a polynomial
Note that we need (m − 1) multiplications to compute f L (X). Now we define the vector-input hash function F . It internally uses a padding function pad(·) : {0, 1} * → ({0, 1} n ) + , which takes x ∈ {0, 1} * and outputs
where i is the smallest non-negative integer such that the total length of x∥10 i in bits becomes a positive multiple of n. F also takes a vector dimension ℓ as a parameter, and we write
n as a key and X = (
where, for 0
) and
The value m i is the length of x i in blocks, where a partial block counts for one block. Note that each z i is a polynomial in L of degree m i . We remark that the multiplication by the constant ⟨2⟩ n can be implemented efficiently. For example, for n = 128 we can choose x 128 + x 7 + x 2 + x + 1, which is one of the irreducible polynomials having the minimum number of non-zero coefficients. Then, for x ∈ {0, 1} 128 , we can compute the product x · ⟨2⟩ 128 as
120 10000111 otherwise, where x ≪ 1 is the left shift of x by one bit (The first bit of x disappears and a zero comes into the last bit). See [13] for details.
Vector-Input ϵ-Almost XOR Universal Hash Function
We next define the notion of a vector-input ϵ-almost XOR universal (VI-ϵ-AXU for short) hash function. This plays an important role in our security analysis. 
Definition 1 (VI-ϵ-AXU hash function). Let ℓ be an integer and
We show that the polynomial hash function F (ℓ) defined in Sect. 3.1 is VI-ϵ-AXU for a small ϵ. A proof is given in Appendix A.
Theorem 1. Let ℓ be an integer and
F (ℓ) : {0, 1} n × ({0, 1} * ) ℓ → {0, 1} n be the polynomial hash function defined in Sect. 3.1, keyed by L ∈ {0, 1} n . Let X = (x 0 , . . . , x ℓ−1 ),X = (x 0 , . . . ,x ℓ−1 ) ∈ ({0, 1} * ) ℓ be any two distinct inputs to F (ℓ) . Then for any Y ∈ {0, 1} n , Pr(L R ← {0, 1} n : F (ℓ) L (X ) ⊕ F (ℓ) L (X ) = Y ) ≤ max{µ(X ), µ(X )} 2 n .
HBS: Hash Block Stealing
We present our HBS, Hash Block Stealing. It takes a blockcipher E as a parameter and uses
n . HBS consists of two algorithms, the encryption algorithm (HBS.Enc) and the decryption algorithm (HBS.Dec). These algorithms are defined in Fig. 1 . See Fig. 2 for a picture illustrating HBS.Enc (See also Fig. 3 for F (2) L (H, M )). The encryption algorithm HBS.Enc takes a key K ∈ {0, 1} k , a header H ∈ {0, 1} * , and a plaintext M ∈ {0, algorithm takes K, H, and (T, C) as its inputs to return the corresponding plaintext M or a special symbol ⊥. The symbol ⊥ indicates that the given inputs are invalid. We write M ← HBS.Dec K (H, (T, C)). We have HBS.Dec K (H, (T, C)) = ⊥ when the decryption process fails.
HBS.Enc and HBS.Dec call subroutines CTR.Enc and CTR.Dec, respectively, which are the encryption and the decryption of the CTR mode using S as its initial counter value. By specification we restrict the message length to 2 n/2 − 1 blocks, as the security of the HBS mode becomes vacuous beyond this point. This restriction allows us to write ⟨i⟩ n = 0 n/2 ∥⟨i⟩ n/2 for an integer 0 ≤ i ≤ 2 n/2 − 1 (We assume that the block length n is an even integer), which implies that the incrementation of the counter in CTR.Enc and CTR.Dec can be done by adding 1 modulo 2 n/2 rather than modulo 2 n .
F (2)
L (H, M ) can be implemented using h+m multiplications and two squaring operations, as in Fig. 3 . See also Fig. 4 for pseudocode. In the figures, we let
SQ" outputs the square of its input, "⊙" is the multiplication, and c0, c1 ∈ {1, 2} are constants.
. zH and zM are n-bit variables, and c0, c1 ∈ {1, 2}.
⌈|H|/n⌉
n ) + and c 0 = 2 otherwise, and
Recall that the multiplication by ⟨2⟩ n can be implemented using a left shift and a conditional XOR, which is a small overhead compared to the multiplication by L. Lastly, we make a remark about handling a message with no header. For such a message, simply ignore the computation of z H and define the value (
Note that this should be differentiated from the case H = ε (the null string), where pad(H) = 10 n−1 .
Security Analysis of HBS
HBS is a mode of operation for deterministic authenticated encryption. Before presenting our security results, we define the security of the mode. Our security definition follows the one given by Rogaway and Shrimpton in [16] .
Security Definition
n be a blockcipher. For notational simplicity, we write
An adversary A is given access to either a pair of
, and the random-bits oracle R(·, ·) returns a random string of n+|M | bits. On query (H, (T,
, and the ⊥(·, ·) oracle returns ⊥ on every input. Queries can be made adaptively, and A's goal is to distinguish between these pairs.
Definition 2. The DAE-advantage Adv
In what follows, the first oracle refers to E K (·, ·) or R(·, ·), and the second oracle refers to D K (·, ·) or ⊥(·, ·). We make the following assumptions about A.
-A does not make a query (H, M ) to its first oracle if the second oracle has returned M in response to some previous query (H, (T, C)). -A does not make a query (H, (T, C)) to its second oracle if the first oracle has returned (T, C) in response to some previous query (H, M ).
The last assumption is without loss of generality, and the first two assumptions are to prevent trivial wins.
We also consider the security of HBS in terms of privacy. An adversary B is given access to either E K (·, ·) or R(·, ·), and B's goal is to distinguish between these oracles.
Definition 3. The PRIV-advantage Adv priv HBS[E] (B) of an adversary B in breaking the privacy of HBS[E] = (E
We deal with HBS[Perm(n)] = (E P , D P ), where a random permutation P R ← Perm(n) is used as the underlying blockcipher. That is, HBS[Perm(n)] is defined by replacing E K and E −1 K in Fig. 1 by P and P −1 , respectively.
Security Theorem
Consider the DAE-advantage of an adversary A attacking HBS[Perm(n)]. We assume A makes a total of at mostueries. For 0
That is, h max is the maximum length of H i , and m max is the maximum length of M i and C i in blocks. The following theorem is our main result on the security of our HBS mode. It shows that HBS provides standard birthday-bound security.
Theorem 2. Let A be an adversary described as above. Then
Given Theorem 2, it is standard to pass to its complexity-theoretic bound, by replacing P R ← Perm(n) with E K (and hence 
The proof of Lemma 1 is standard and omitted (For example, see [1] ). Now we turn to Theorem 2. The proof is based on the following lemma. 
Lemma 2. Let A be an adversary as in Theorem 2. Then there exists an adversary B such that
We can view A in p 0 as attacking the privacy of HBS[Perm(n)], as the second oracle always returns ⊥. So there exists B such that p 0 ≤ Adv priv HBS[Perm(n)] (B). To derive the upper bound on p 1 , we observe that the oracles are identical unless the D P (·, ·) oracle returns something other than ⊥. We thus have
where
To derive the upper bound on the forgery probability, we introduce an oracle V P (·, ·) that takes ((H, M ), T ) as its input and
The proof for the first claim is rather complicated but the second one follows from the standard argument that distinguishing is easier than forging, and Lemma 2 follows. Now to prove Theorem 2, it suffices to bound Adv priv HBS[Perm(n)] (B). Recall that B is an adversary attacking the privacy of HBS[Perm(n)], where B makes a query of the form (H i , M i ) for 0 ≤ i ≤ q − 1. We assume that H i is at most h max blocks, and M i is at most m max blocks. We have the following result.
Lemma 3. Let B be an adversary as described above. Then
Let us explain the intuitive reasoning behind the bound, leaving a complete proof in Appendix C. Suppose B makesueries (
, which corresponds to the initial counter value, and we consider the set
Each element in S i is the input value to P at the i-th query. Notice that we never have a collision within S i , but we may have 0 n ∈ S i , or S i ∩ S j ̸ = ∅. Both events may be useful for B to mount an distinguishing attack. Now for the first event, we know that F
where 0 ≤ s ≤ m i and 0 ≤ t ≤ m j . Theorem 1 ensures that the equality holds with only a small probability. It turns out that during the attack, with a high probability, we have 0 n ̸ ∈ S i for 0 ≤ i ≤ q − 1, and
Under this assumption, what B learns is the output values of P for distinct input values, and hence B cannot distinguish it from a truly random string.
Given Lemma 2 and Lemma 3, we find the proof of Theorem 2 straightforward, as we have
where the first inequality follows from Lemma 2, the next one from Lemma 3, and the last one from easy simplification. [18, 9] . The choice of f L enables us to handle variable-length inputs without increasing the number of multiplications. We note that the degree of our polynomial f L is higher than that of g L . However, the difference is only one, and the decrease in the security bound due to the increase in the degree should be negligible in practice.
L is designed to handle an ℓ-dimensional vector efficiently. For an input (x 0 , . . . , x ℓ−1 ) ∈ ({0, 1} * ) ℓ , we need just ⌈|x 0 |/n⌉ + · · · + ⌈|x 0 |/n⌉ + ℓ multiplications. We may need additional ℓ shifts and XOR's depending on the length of each component, but the cost for these operations is fairly low. Moreover, F (2) L allows us to reuse z H or z M in Fig. 4 if H 
In contrast, the polynomial hash in GCM was designed to accept only twodimensional vectors (H, M ), and the lengths of H and M were encoded into a block as ⟨|H|⟩ n/2 ∥⟨|M |⟩ n/2 . One could handle, say, three-dimensional vectors by encoding the lengths into a block, but such an approach would severely limit the maximum length of each component, which is solved in our hash function
L , as compared to the vectorized CMAC [16] , is that the (maximum) dimension ℓ needs to be fixed in advance. In order to lift this restriction, we can start with the hash function F (2) L for two-dimensional vectors and then "increase" the dimension by utilizing the values √ L,
. ., upon receiving 3-, 4-, 5-, . . ., dimensional vectors. Although we can efficiently compute the square root √ L of an element L ∈ GF (2 n ), we admit that this solution results in rather complicated algorithms.
As with the polynomial hash in GCM [9] , L = 0 n is a weak key for F
to avoid the problem at the cost of slight decrease in the security bound. But since L = 0 n only occurs with a probability 1/2 n , we do not adopt this approach. The birthday attack on GCM described in [4] can be made also on our HBS mode. Therefore, as with GCM, one needs to update the secret key well before processing 2 n/2 blocks.
Comparison with SIV. HBS basically follows the design of SIV [16] , but there are important differences. HBS works with a single key, and SIV [16] uses two separate keys, one for encryption and the other for MAC. SIV works as follows. First, let IV ← CMAC * K1 (H, M ) and C ← CTR.Enc K2 (IV , M ). Then the output is (IV , C), where CMAC * is constructed from CMAC [5, 11] to handle a vector input (H, M ).
In Table 1 , we make a brief comparison between SIV and HBS. HBS reduces the keying material and replaces ⌈|M |/n⌉ + ⌈|H|/n⌉ blockcipher calls by ⌈|M |/n⌉+⌈|H|/n⌉+2 multiplications at the cost of a stronger assumption about the blockcipher. The SPRP assumption is needed as we "steal" the result of hash computation (hash block) and use it as the initial counter value. However, we argue that this does not seem to make a substantial difference in practice, because many of the modern blockciphers, such as AES, seem to satisfy the strong property of SPRP. Rather, we admit that it may be disadvantageous of HBS to require the inverse cipher. This is especially true for blockciphers of asymmetric encryption/decryption design, such as AES. 
Further Discussion: Beyond the Birthday Bound
HBS delivers fine performance and provides security up to the birthday bound. It might be beneficial to come up with a DAE construction whose security is beyond the birthday bound. Such a construction would most likely be less efficient than HBS but might be desirable for some cases, as explained below.
Recall that DAE demands that the message space be of high entropy. An important example is the key wrap [10] , since a key space obviously has high entropy. Although a key length is usually very short and a query complexity exceeding the birthday bound is hard to imagine in such a scenario, the highest security possible is desired for key-wrap applications. Therefore, highly secure constructions stand as suitable candidates for such systems, even if their performance is relatively modest.
We could give a beyond-the-birthday-bound construction as follows. First construct a 2n-to-2n-bit blockcipher E ′ : {0, 1} 2n → {0, 1} 2n , which has a certain key space, from a blockcipher E K : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n with K ∈ {0, 1} k via the sum construction [7] and the Feistel network of six rounds [12] . Then construct the HBS mode with the block size of 2n bits, using E ′ as its underlying blockcipher. This construction ensures security beyond the 2 n/2 bound but has the following three problems.
It is inefficient and impractical. One call to E
′ requires twelve calls to E. 2. It requires more than one key. The key space of E ′ is large. 3. It produces a long ciphertext. The tag size is 2n-bit rather than n-bit.
The last point might be contrasted with the double-pipe hash [8] , which has 2n-bit intermediate values but outputs n-bit hash values. It remains open to provide a beyond-the-birthday-bound construction which resolves these problems.
A Proof of Theorem 1
We have 2 n possible values of L ∈ {0, 1} n . We show that
n ) + , and c i = 2 if x i ∈ ({0, 1} n ) + . We usex i ,X i ,ẑ i andĉ i in the same way.
Observe that, from (1),
We show (2) is a non-zero, non-constant polynomial in the following three cases.
Case 1: |X
i | ̸ = |X i | for some 0 ≤ i ≤ ℓ − 1, Case 2: |X i | = |X i | for all 0 ≤ i ≤ ℓ−1, but X i [j] ̸ =X i [j] for some 0 ≤ i ≤ ℓ−1 and 0 ≤ j ≤ m i − 1,
and Case 3:
For the first case, if
To see this, we note that the polynomial is equivalent to
and therefore the coefficient of
For the second case, consider i and j such that 0 
is non-zero since
and the right hand side is zero if and only if
Finally, we consider the third case. In this case, we claim that we must have
This contradicts the condition X ̸ =X . Similarly, if x i ,x i ̸ ∈ ({0, 1} n ) + holds for all 0 ≤ i ≤ ℓ − 1, then again it contradicts the fact X ̸ =X . Now without loss of generality, we may assume that x i ∈ ({0, 1} n )
can be written as (3), and since we have
B Proof of Lemma 2
Let p 0 and p 1 be as defined in Sect. 4.2. We have already shown that p 0 ≤ Adv priv HBS[Perm(n)] (B) and p 1 ≤ Pr(A EP (·,·),DP (·,·) forges). In the rest of this section we evaluate the last probability.
We introduce two oracles O P (·, ·) and
n × N (s < 2 n ) as its input and returns
takes ((H, M ), T ) as its input and returns
= T or returns ⊥ otherwise. We observe that the D P (·, ·) oracle can be perfectly simulated by using these two oracles O P (·, ·) and V P (·, ·). Therefore, there exists an adversary A 1 such that
We use the following system of notation. Consider all queries to the E P (·, ·) oracle. Also consider those queries to the V P (·, ·) oracle which make the oracle return T (i.e., forgery). Enumerate these queries, in the order of being made, as ( (T i , s i ) . We classify the queries to the O P (·, ·) oracle into three categories: root queries, chain queries, and extension queries.
Note that some of the chain/extension queries to the O P (·, ·) oracle, even if the query itself is new, may be trivial in the sense that the adversary A 1 already knows the to-be-returned value. For example, if P (T ⊕ ⟨s 1 
The second argument is treated as an integer). Whenever possible, we implicitly exclude these trivial queries from our consideration. Now we are ready to introduce a modified oracle O P,P (·, ·) for A 1 , wherẽ P R ← Perm(n) is a random permutation independent of P . The oracle is defined in the style of lazy sampling forP . The oracle keeps a record of domain points S 1 ,S 2 , . . . and that of range pointsỸ 1 ,Ỹ 2 , . . . in a linked way. For this, the oracle needs to observe the vectors Y i output by the E P (·, ·) / V P (·, ·) oracle. Let (T, s) be the current query made to the O P,P (·, ·) oracle.
1. If (T, s) is a trivial query, then the oracle simply returns the expected value. 2. If (T, s) is a root query, the oracle adds the point T to the set of range points
, where i runs over already-defined domain points. The oracle updates the record If not, then the oracle adds the pointS ⊕ ⟨s⟩ n to the set of domain points, picksỸ
, addsỸ to the set of range points and returnsỸ .
If (T, s) is a chain query, then it means thatS =P
−1 (T ) is in the set {S 1 ,S 2 , . . .} butS ⊕ ⟨s⟩ n is not. So the oracle adds the point to the set
and addsỸ to the set of range points. This establishes a linkP (S ⊕ ⟨s⟩ n ) =Ỹ , and the valueỸ is returned. 4. Finally, if (T, s) is an extension query, then it means that the oracle has located a vector Y i and an integer t such that
The task is to return a value corresponding to O P,P (Y i [0], ⟨t⟩ n ⊕ ⟨s⟩ n ). For this, the oracle picksỸ
, addsỸ to the set of range points and returnsỸ . Note that no domain point is selected; no domain point is linked to the range pointỸ . However, the range pointỸ is linked to the vector Y i through the "distance" ⟨t⟩ n ⊕ ⟨s⟩ n .
We want to evaluate the quantity
It turns out that the evaluation of p 2 requires a fair amount of work. So we defer the treatment of p 2 until we finish evaluating the second forgery probability in (4). Observe that there exists an adversary A 2 such that
because the adversary A 2 can perfectly simulate the O P,P (·, ·) oracle by observing the vectors Y i and performing lazy sampling forP . We apply the standard argument that distinguishing is easier than forging. Namely, there exists an adversary B such that
The adversary B simulates the two oracles for A 2 by using its own oracle and outputs 1 as soon as A 2 forges. If B's oracle is E P (·, ·), the simulation is perfect and hence Pr (
, then each time A 2 makes a query to the second oracle, the probability of forgery is 1/2 n (prior to the execution of the game) and so Pr (
n . Now we come back to the evaluation of p 2 . Consider those queries to the V P (·, ·) oracle for which the oracle returns ⊥. Enumerate these queries, in the order of being made, as ((
We consider the following bad events in the latter game in (4) .
We argue that the two games in (4) (referred to as the first and the second games) proceed exactly the same as long as none of (i)-(vii) bad events occurs. This means that we have
causes one of (i)-(vii) ) .
To see this, it is helpful to consider the permutation P as lazily sampled. We check this one by one.
1. Consider a query (say the i-th query) either to the E P (·, ·) oracle or to the V P (·, ·) oracle (returning 1). Thanks to (i), (ii) and (iii), it is guaranteed that the set S i consists of entirely fresh domain points for P (unless a query with (H i , M i ) has been made to the V P (·, ·) oracle returning ⊥). This results in lazy sampling of points for Y i . In the first game, these points are sampled from {0,
, where j runs over alreadydefined points. In the second game, the points are sampled from {0,
. The two distributions remain the same due to (v). 2. Consider a root query (T, s) to the O P (·, ·) or O P,P (·, ·) oracle. Note that (vii) eliminates the possibility T = L. In the first game, a domain point S is sampled for
. In the second game, a domain point S is sampled (forP
. These are the same distribution due to (iii). In both the games, the shifted domain point S ⊕ ⟨s⟩ n is not fresh under the same condition that there exists some i such that S ⊕ ⟨s⟩ n =S i . This is due to (iii) and (iv). If it is fresh, then in the first game a range pointỸ is sampled from {0,
, whereas in the second game a range pointỸ is sampled from {0,
. These are the same owing to (vi) and (vii). 3. Consider a chain query to the O P (·, ·) or O P,P (·, ·) oracle. Thanks to (i), (ii) and (iii), the query results in a fresh domain point P −1 (T ) ⊕ ⟨s⟩ n in the first game andP −1 (T ) ⊕ ⟨s⟩ n in the second. In the first game, the corresponding range point is sampled from {0,
. In the second game, the range point is sampled from {0,
. These two yield the same distribution because of (vi) and (vii). 4. Consider an extension query (T, s) to the O P (·, ·) or O P,P (·, ·) oracle. Thanks to (i), (ii) and (iii), the query results in a fresh domain point P −1 (T ) ⊕ ⟨s⟩ n . In the first game, the corresponding range point is sampled from {0,
In the second game, the range point is sampled from {0,
. These two sampling processes yield the same distribution due to (vi) and (vii). 5. Consider a query (say the i-th query) to the V P (·, ·) oracle returning ⊥. If a query with (H i , M i ) has been made to one of the oracles, then no sampling is performed. Otherwise, owing to (i), (ii) and (iii), the point U i is a fresh domain point. This results in lazy sampling of Z i . In the first game,
In the second game, it is sampled from {0,
. These two distributions remain the same because of (vi). Now we replace P with a random function R R ← Func(n) (The set of all functions on {0, 1} n ). This is possible because the inverse cipher P −1 never appears in the definitions of the three oracles. By the PRP/PRF switching lemma [2] , we get
We introduce a modified oracle E
• R (·, ·). This oracle behaves just like the E R (·, ·) oracle, computing the values for S i using L = R(0 n ), except that at the end of query process, even if a bad event has occurred, the oracle returns a random string, which defines the value of Y i (unless a query with (H i , M i ) has been made to one of the oracles, in which case those already-defined values are used). The V • R (·, ·) oracle is defined similarly. That is, unless a query with (H i , M i ) has been already made, the oracle computes the value S i / U i using L = R(0 n ) and, regardless of a bad event, picks a random point in {0, 1} n . If this point happens to be the same as T , then the oracle returns T . Otherwise, the random point is set to Z i , and the oracle returns ⊥. The modified oracles are identical to the original ones until a bad event occurs, so we have
) .
Now observe that the values returned by the three oracles are independent of the value L = R(0 n ). So we are ready to evaluate the probabilities of (i)-(vii). Without loss of generality we assume that the bad events are disjoint. This can be done by defining a bad event to occur prior to any other bad event. So, for example, when we say "the event (i) occurs," we implicitly mean that no other bad event has occurred. An event of type (i) occurs upon a query (
Here, we have 1 ≤ i ≤ q, and the degree of the equation is at most 2(1 + h max + m max ). Therefore, we have
Event (ii) corresponds to queries (H
Event (iii) corresponds to a query (H i , M i ) and a root query (T j , s j ) (either one may be made before the other) such that F (2) L (H i , M i ) =S j ⊕ ⟨s⟩ n with 0 ≤ s ≤ 2m max . Note that A 1 makes at most q-many root queries (rather than q(1 + m max )-many). So we have
An event of type (iv) occurs upon a root query (T i , s i ) satisfyingS j = ⟨s⟩ n for some 0 ≤ s ≤ 2m max . The sampling is performed from the space {0, 1} n \ {0 n } for at most q-many distinct points, so we have 
For event (vi), there are three cases. The first case is upon the sampling of Z i . This case can be treated similarly to event (v), and the probability is at most q·q(1+m max )/2 n = q 2 (1+m max )/2 n . The second case is upon a root query (T, s) such that T = Z i for some i. The values Z 1 , Z 2 , . . . are simply random points, the number of which is at most q. There are at most q-many root queries, so the probability is at most q 2 /2 n . The third case is upon the sampling of a range pointỸ j . Note that such a sampling is performed for at most q(1 + m max ) times. So the probability is at most q 2 (1 + m max )/2 n . Overall, the probability for event (vi) is at most
For event (vii), observe that the number of pointsỸ 1 ,Ỹ 2 , . . . is at most q(1 + m max ). So we simply have
Finally we sum up the terms. This yields
⊓ ⊔
C Proof of Lemma 3
We consider the encryption algorithm E R (·, ·) of "HBS[Func(n)]," where Func(n) is the set of all functions over {0, 1} n , and a random function R R ← Func(n) is used as the underlying blockcipher (Obviously the decryption algorithm cannot be defined). We see that
from the PRP/PRF switching lemma [2] . We then use the following lemma to prove Lemma 3. 
Lemma 4.
where we define p 3 Proof. The proof is based on a counting argument. We count the number of functions R ∈ Func(n) that satisfy E R (H i , M i ) = (T i , C i ) for 0 ≤ i ≤ q − 1. We first count the number of L = R(0 n ) and then count the rest. Let
L (H i , M i ). S i corresponds to the initial counter value. Consider the set S i = {S i , S i ⊕ ⟨1⟩ n , S i ⊕ ⟨2⟩ n , . . . , S i ⊕ ⟨m i ⟩ n }. Now we claim that the number of L ∈ {0, 1} n such that
is at least 2 n −2q(1+m max )(1+h max +m max )−q 2 (1+2m max )(1+h max +m max ). Once we fix any L that satisfies (7), the inputs to R, {0 n } ∪ S 0 ∪ · · · ∪ S q−1 , are all distinct. Therefore, the left hand side of (6) 2 )/2 n , and by applying the same argument to 1 − P HBS and 1 − P R , we have 1 − P HBS ≥ 1 − P R − (3q 2 (1 + h max + 2m max ) 2 )/2 n . Finally, from (5), we obtain the claimed bound.
⊓ ⊔
